By Maj. Gen. G D Bakshi
Rafale deal is precisely an emergency measure to plug India’s air power gap :It is essential that we understand the backdrop and perspective of the Rafale deal. In the 1990s the IAF had gone in for the Mirage-2000 French fighters to counter the F-16s supplied by the USA to Pakistan. The IAF was delighted with this French aircraft. It was then state-of-the-art and had a modular system of replacement, which really cut down the time spent on maintenance and repairs.
This meant that this fighter (unlike its Soviet counterparts) was available for 70-80% of the time as down-time for repairs / maintenance was cut to a minimum. This in effect reduced overall life cycle costs of the aircraft. Thus while the Soviet and later Russian fighters were much cheaper in terms of initial purchase costs, their lifecycle costs turned out to be relatively much higher due to longer down- time due to repairs and maintenance etc.
Then came the Kargil War in 1999 and the Mirages of the IAF put in a spectacular performance. The Air Force, in fact, was so satisfied with this French aircraft that it asked the Indian government to buy some 50 more Mirages. Given the tortuous bureaucratic process, by the time this deal could even be initialized, the French had stopped producing this fighter and had moved on to the Rafale. If India had been smart, it could perhaps have brought off the French plant and assembly line for the Mirage and manufactured these aircraft at home. The Indian system, however, is simply incapable of responding with speed and alacrity to such fleeting opportunities. The French, therefore, told us that they had stopped the production of Mirages and offered us the Rafale instead. To avoid a single vendor situation, the MoD asked that we have an open competition.
This set the stage for what was billed as the fighter deal of the century. The RFP was issued in 2007. The aircraft in the fray were the American F-16 and F-18, the Tornado of the EU, the Rafale of the French, the Mig-35 of the Russians and the Saab Draken of the Swedes. Extensive and elaborate technical trials were carried out by the IAF. Ultimately, the Tornado was adjudged the best and the Rafale a close second. The Americans were enraged at losing this deal and pulled out their ambassador (Romer) from Delhi .These shortlisted firms were then asked to submit their commercial bids in which the French outbid the Europeans.
Detailed negotiations now began for outright purchase of 18 aircraft and licensed manufacture of some 124 in India with complete transfer of technology (TOT). These negotiations, however, dragged on interminably for three years. The French also seemed to be having second thoughts about complete transfer of cutting edge technology.
In the meantime, the backbone of the IAF, India’s aging fleet of Mig-21s, Mig-23s and Mig-27s was fast reaching obsolescence. The Migs were technology from the 1960s/70s era and despite upgrades now badly needed to be phased out. In fact, the Mig-21s were now literally falling out of the skies. The LCA was nowhere in sight, nor was the Rafale and the Vth generation fighter Sukhoi – PAK-50 was still a pie in the sky. As a result, the IAF was bleeding dangerously.
The IAFs squadron strength was depleting fast and in a most dangerous fashion. The optimal requirement was 45 squadrons but the IAF was soon down to 32 and, as per CAG reports, had come down to just 28 or so. This was an alarming situation. The modern RMA (revolution in military affairs) is primarily based upon air power. Without an edge in airpower, no nation can hope to win a war. Yet the terribly skewed Indian weapon procurement system had created a disastrous situation due to its sheer bureaucratic inertia and decision grid–lock.
We lost 10 critical years in UPA-I and II, in which the PLAFF of China as well as the Pakistan Air Force made rapid strides. All the desperate appeals by the IAF fell on deaf ears. The UPA administration had apparently convinced itself that wars were just not possible anymore and hence its priority was to dish out doles and subsidies to ensure its re-election. Its sluggishness in acquiring combat aircraft formed an obscene contrast to the speed with which it decided to buy 12 outlandishly expensive VVIP helicopters, which even the US President had found a tad too expensive.
This then was the very precarious position inherited by the Modi government in 2014. Not only the IAF, the Indian Army and the Navy too were suffering inordinately due to a complete failure to modernise the aeging weapon systems. The situation called for drastic measures and it is to the present government’s credit that it has not flinched from buying them. The recent Rafale deal is nothing short of emergency surgery/resuscitation for the IAF. It is badly needed to plug the gaps and gaping holes in the squadron strength of the IAF. As many as 36 Rafales coming within the next two years will be a boon for the IAF. The Rafale is a twin engine fighter with a very modern electronically scanned radar and electronic jamming suite. It is capable of air-to-air refueling and carries long range BVR missiles. It has a strike range of 3700kms and can carry three times the payload of the Tejas.
However it is now learnt that the plan to make 108 Rafales in India may not come through. The original plan was to replace 10 squadrons of Mig- 21s and 4 of Mig- 27s with 6 sqadrons of LCA and 6 of Rafales. If this fails to materialize, the Modi government must act with alacrity and plug this void by rapidly inducting the tried and tested SU-30s from Russia in good numbers to fill up the depleting squadron strength and prepare India for the contingency of a two front war. After the shock of the 1962 defeat, the IAF had asked for a 60 squadron Air Force to deal with a two front scenario. Because of resource constraints, we could not go beyond 45 squadrons. Today, however, we have slipped below 30 and it calls for emergency measures to rapidly plug the air power gap. The Rafale deal is precisely such an emergency measure.
Maj. Gen. G D Bakshi
Author is Former GoC, Romeo Force of Indian army and a strategic expert. His books include, War in the 21st Century, The Indian Art Of War, The Rise of Indian Military Power: Evolution of an Indian Strategic Culture etc. He is also a famed TV Commentator, Analyst.
